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I
In order to write on the distinctiveness of the international legal
order by comparison and contrast, it is, first of all, necessary to clarify
the meaning of this problem. Such clarification again presupposes a
firm theoretical basis from which to start. A sketch of this writer's
views on these preliminary problems will be given here by way of
introduction.
With which legal orders do we compare and contrast the inter-
national legal order? Most writers, such as John Austin, believe the
comparison can only be made with advanced municipal legal orders,
but that constitutes an unjustified narrowing of the concept of law.
Primitive law is law, too. If we take into consideration also con-
stitutional and administrative law, the distinctiveness of international
law appears in a different light. It has correctly been stated that many
problems of modern labor law can be analogized to problems of inter-
national law.
All that presupposes a basic concept of what law is. For this
writer a legal order is a system of norms, prescriptive in nature-a
coercive order which regulates human conduct in such a way that
under certain conditions prescribed by law a legal sanction, as de-
termined by law, ought to follow; the particularity of a legal sanction,
as compared, e.g., with a moral sanction, consists in the fact that the
sanction, prescribed by law, ought to take place on this earth' with-
out or against the will of the person against which it is applied and
* Professor of International Law, University of Toledo; Member of the Board of
Editors, American journal of International Law.
1 Sanctions of religious norms are transcendent.
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ought to be executed if necessary by the application of physical force.2
This delimits a legal norm, not only against the "laws of natural
science" which are statements of facts linking cause to effect, but also
against norms of other normative systems, such as moral, religious or
conventional norms. Whatever the "realists" may tell us, it is obvious
that the corresponding norm of criminal law does not predict that a
murderer will be hanged-which is often not the case-but that he
ought to be hanged. Laws of natural science, including sociology, can
only be true or false; legal norms can only be valid or not. Neverthe-
less, the "oughtness" is not without links to "isness" and the norms
of law are standards of valuation of the real conduct of men; a norm
must be valid, but it must further be, by and large, effective. Mere
paper rules are not legal norms.
This analytical definition of a legal norm does not overlook either
the contents of the norm or the fact and values. The making of the
law is, of course, a political, sociological, and historical problem; a
problem in the realm of "isness." But the norm thus created is the objec-
tive meaning of the norm-creating act-a prescription in the realm of
"oughtness." This writer has always insisted that a knowledge of all
three elements-norms, facts and values-is necessary in order to
understand a given legal order fully. One must not only study the
legal norms analytically; one must also know how they were made,
the political and sociological environment from which they arose, the
basic values on which they are based, the ultimate ends which they
want to realize-all that is of particular importance with regard to
international law.
One must further take the whole legal order into consideration.
Continental lawyers restrict the "law" often to the constitution, statutes
and ordinances; whereas, contracts, judicial, and administrative deci-
sions are for them not "law," but only "application" of law. American
"realists," on the other hand, see only Court decisions and sometimes
deny even the existence of general legal norms. For Continental law-
yers, there are only general legal norms, for "realists" there are only
individual legal norms. This stand is certainly a consequence of the
history of the two legal systems: the codified law, based on Roman
law, where the legal hero is the legislator (and, perhaps, the savant),
whereas the judge remains in anonymous obscurity; and the "judge-
made" Common Law. But both standpoints are theoretically unten-
able. A legal order is a dynamic system which itself regulates the
creation of the law-a "pyramid" consisting of general as well as indi-
vidual legal norms. It is not possible to strictly delimit "creation"
2 See Josef L. Kunz, "Sanctions in International Law," 94 Am. J. Int'l L. 324
(1960).
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and "application" of law. Just as the legislator creating a statute, at
the same time applies constitutional norms, thus a judge is never
merely an automatic "applier" but always also a creator of law, crea-
tor of an individual legal norm, and under some legal orders, also a
creator of general legal norms.
We must, further, not only know with what we have to compare
and contrast, but we must know also what is meant by the "interna-
tional law," which is to be compared and contrasted. It is clear that
such international law as may have existed earlier 3 has no historical
connection with our present-day international law with which we
are to deal. Our international law is strictly a historical creation of
Western Europe; it is, therefore, not necessarily the international law,
but only one of the possible international laws. It came historically
into being among the Christian States of Western Europe. It presup-
poses in consequence a plurality of sovereign states having a certain
community of culture and interests and being in contact inter se.
There is already here a certain distinctiveness: there must not always
be an international law in our sense, namely where these presupposi-
tions do not exist; thus, there was no international law in the Im-
perium Romanum, nor between Medieval Europe and the Inca Empire.
Nor is there any guarantee that our international law will con-
tinue to exist in the future. Like any historical creation, it may come
to an end and be replaced by something else. There is a theoretical,
although at this time no practical, possibility of a World State. Wheth-
er it would be created by one Power or as a World Federal State, it
would mean that our international law has come to an end and been
replaced by "world law," i.e., the municipal law of the World State.
There is a further distinctiveness. From the moment that our
international law came into existence up to the present day, its legal
character has been challenged, whereas ancient, primitive Germanic
law, or the primitive law of African tribes has always been recognized
as law. Now, if international law were not law, it would make no sense
to compare and contrast it with other legal orders; one would only
have to delimit it from law, as Austin did, who saw in international
law not law, but only "positive morality." Naturally, this fundamental
problem of whether international law is law at all cannot be investi-
gated here. For this writer it is law, although primitive law. As our
international law is based on the practice of states, it seems to us
sufficient here to point out that the practice of states has treated inter-
national law at all times as law in the legal sense and carefully and
sharply distinguishes it from other international normative systems,
such as "international ethics" and "courtoisie internationale."
3 E.g., Inter-Hellenic law, ancient Hindu, ancient Chinese "international law."
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II
The international law to be compared and contrasted is the his-
torical creation of Western Europe. Although it has its roots in the
Middle Ages of Catholic Western Europe, in the "Communitas Chris-
tiana,"4 it is exactly through the decentralization of this medieval
Christian Community that both the single sovereign States and our
international law came into being. It was a new law-a fresh start.
A legal order must not only have a structure, but also a content;
legal norms must be created, and the creators of law cannot shape its
contents ex nihila. The creation of early international law was done
by Catholic theologians, and later by lawyers based on the Roman
Law. That explains why many rules of international law,5 some of
them still valid today, are mere transplantations of norms of Roman
private law into the international sphere. That explains also the great
role of "natural law" in early international law, as this "natural law"
came from Roman Law-which itself was regarded on the Continent
as "ratio scripta"-and the dogmas of Christianity. This early inter-
national law was valid only for the Christian states of Western Europe
and the Holy See.6 This early international law was exclusively based
on the values of the Greek-Christian, Occidental culture.'
Now, this early international law has seen, from the fifteenth
century to the end of the First World War, a great development, both
as to its contents and to the territorial sphere of its validity. In the
latter respect, the United States and the Latin-American Republics
became members of the international community, and later other
states, like Australia and New Zealand, based primarily on the Occi-
dental culture. To this geographical expansion outside of Europe came
an expansion outside of the Occidental culture. In 1856 Turkey was
4 This "Communitas Christiana" was wider than the Holy Roman Empire of the
Germanic Nation, for England and Scandinavia never belonged to this Holy Roman
Empire. There were, on the other hand, co-existent cultures, outside the "Communitas
Christiana": the States of the Byzantine culture of Eastern Europe and the Arabic-
Islamic world.
5 E.g., acquisition of sovereignty by occupatio of terrae nullius, pacta sunt servanda,
rules, concerning alluvio and avulsio, international servitudes, state succession, and so on.
Roscoe Pound stated recently "Grotius wrote to a picture of two second-century Romans
owning adjoining land" "A World Legal Order," Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.
1959. p. 10.
6 That the Holy See, contrary to all other churches, has been and is up to the
present day, a permanent member of the international community, has a historical
explanation. See Josef L. Kunz, "The Status of the Holy See in International Law,"
46 Am. J. Int'l L. 308 (1952).
7 "Existent international law is the creation of but one historical portion of one
living culture." Northrop, "Contemporaneous Jurisprudence and International Law,"
61 Yale L.. 636 (1952).
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admitted into the international community; from that time on to 1914,
and in League of Nations times, international law, originally a "re-
gional" law of Christian Western Europe, became valid for nearly all
States, regardless of continent, religion, culture, race and so on; it
had become universal. The world-wide expansion of our international
law was strictly a historical phenomenon. Hence, just as there is no
guarantee that our international law will be valid in all future times,
there is no guarantee that it will retain its universal validity at all times.
Another fundamental remark has to be made. While international
law, although primitive in structure and content, has seen this great
development as to its content and as to its territorial validity up to
1914, this development of international law has shown, contrary to
many advanced municipal legal orders, a remarkable stability and a
clear continuity, and no revolutionary change as to its basic structure
has occurred. It remained based on the same sociological foundations,
on European legal systems-rather pre-dominantly Roman Law-an-
chored exclusively on the values of the Occidental culture, notwith-
standing its universal validity. It was the law of a world in which
Europe and the United States, equally of the Occidental culture, domi-
nated in all fields; of a world in which Europe, through colonies, pro-
tectorates, and many other devices dominated Asia and Africa. This
period of hundreds of years, up to 1914, may be called, for reasons
of brevity, the period of the "classic" law of nations.
But since the end of the First World War, and particularly since
1945, international law has been in a period of uncertainty, constant
flux, transformation and crisis; we may speak, for reasons of brevity,
of the "new" international law. But while 1914 constitutes a turning-
point in the development of our international law, it does not consti-
tute a break; it is only a new phase of the development of our interna-
tional law. This insight dictates the approach to writing on the
distinctiveness of the international legal order by comparison and con-
trast: first, this distinctiveness of the "classic" international law must
be briefly investigated; then, the difference between the "new" and
the "classic" law of nations must be briefly stated, showing that, in
spite of this difference, the distinctiveness of international law, whether
before or after 1914, compared with other legal orders, has only
changed in degree, but not in kind.
III
If we compare "classic" international law with all other legal
orders, it is law. If we compare it with the advanced municipal legal
orders of sovereign States and, particularly, with private law, it is
law, but a law of a different type. If we, finally, compare it with cer-
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
tain fields of advanced municipal law, such as constitutional law or
modern labor law, this difference becomes somewhat deminimis. This
difference between "classic" international law and advanced municipal
legal orders has two different sources; the primitiveness of structure,
and certain particularities of a sociological nature.
From its beginnings up to 1914, our international law was nearly
exclusively8 the law "between" sovereign States, first between those of
Christian Western Europe, then by 1914, between nearly all sovereign
States. Its definition as "the body of customary and treaty rules which
are considered legally binding by States in their intercourse with each
other"9 was correct. Our international law came into being, as stated,
together with the coming into existence of national, territorial, and
sovereign states through the decentralization of the "Communitas
Christiana." That explains that these sovereign States, as well as the
international community, are primarily territorial communities. Mod-
ern municipal law, as well as international law, are legal orders on a
territorial rather than on a personal basis. That explains that certain
principles came into existence which, more or less, have remained
basic up to the present day-the sovereignty of states, their equality
and independence, their jurisdiction within the territorial limits of the
state. It was the claim to sovereignty, with which the "divisio reg-
norum" started; Bartolus' definition of sovereign states as "civitates
superiorem non recognoscentes" lead to the definition of Bodin. The
bearer of sovereignty has changed-originally "the prince," since
the French Revolution "la nation," and since the nineteenth century
"the State." But sovereignty has remained basic for international law.
In the sense of Bartolus' definition it has had and has "no superior"; it
is a "law inter pares," a "law of coordination," not, as advanced mu-
nicipal legal orders, a law of subordination.
Primitiveness is not a feature of international law alone, it is
characteristic for all law, whether municipal or international, at a cer-
tain stage of its development. The primitiveness of any legal order
is a consequence of its lack of organization, of its lack of centralization.
"Classic" international law was-and international law is still today-
a highly decentralized legal order. It is decentralized dynamically by
its lack of special organs for the making, application and the execution
of its norms. As in any primitive law, all these functions must be
exercised by the members of the legal community, here by the sover-
eign states. There are no special organs for the creation of norms of
international law, there was and is no international legislature; hence,
8 Exceptions: The Holy See, and insurgents, recognized as a belligerent party.
9 Thus, the first sentence in I Oppenheim-Lauterpacht, International Law 5 (8th ed.
London. 1955).
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the sovereign states are not only the nearly exclusive subjects, but also
the creators of the rules of international law; the methods of creation-
custom and treaty-are highly decentralized. General international
law, binding on all the states of the international community, has been
created only by custom. Treaty law is always particular international
law, binding only on the states which have ratified the treaty. Tb that
extent the norms of general international law created by custom are
relatively few whereas the bulk of modern international law consists
of treaty law binding only on certain states. The small range of inter-
national law, up to 1914, is not only to be explained by the lack of an
international legislature, but also by the fact that "classic" interna-
tional law dealt nearly exclusively with the rights and duties of sover-
eign states and that many problems, although of the highest interna-
tional importance, were excluded by "sovereignty" and exclusive
jurisdiction of the members of the international community.
International law was decentralized dynamically by the fact that
its norms oblige only states, not individuals. An international norm
prescribes what is or is not to be done by a "state," and delegates to
the municipal legal orders the function to designate the persons who,
as organs of the states, have to do it. The acts of these individuals
are imputed by international law not to them, but to the states, on
behalf of which they act. Treaties, granting certain advantages to
the citizens of the contracting parties, must first be "transformed" into
municipal law. International law is, therefore, not only a primitive,
but also an incomplete legal order which needs the municipal legal
orders for the completion of its own norms.
There are no special organs for the application of international
law. Thus, there are no special international organs to ascertain ob-
jectively whether a territorial community has fulfilled the conditions
laid down by international law for the coming into existence of a new
sovereign state; hence, the "recognition" of new states is left to the
existing sovereign states. In consequence of the lack of special inter-
national organs, sovereign states, under general international law, have
the right of auto-interpretation of the treaties which they have con-
cluded, although this right ought to be exercised in good faith. For
the same reason, sovereign states, under general international law, have
a right of auto-determination of the existence of an international de-
linquency as well as of its legal consequences. As there is, under gen-
eral international law, a complete lack of collective sanctions, neither
special organs nor a monopoly of force are at the disposal of the inter-
national community. General international law, like any primitive law,
must rely on the principle of self-help under general international law,
reprisals, and war.
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
General international law recognizes the validity of certain trea-
ties, even if they are imposed by force upon the other party; it does
not distinguish delinquencies into torts and crimes; it makes no dis-
tinction as to sanctions between civil execution and criminal penalty;
it does not know individual responsibility for fault, but only absolute,
collective responsibility. The primitiveness of "classic" international
law is emphasized by the great importance which the principle of
effectivity bears.
The tremendous disadvantages of "classic" international law as a
primitive law are obvious; it was, primarily, a static law. It was im-
possible to state with legal authenticity which state in an international
conflict was legally right and which legally wrong. In the case of the
application of force, it was again impossible to state objectively which
state acted legally. Custom, as the only way of creating norms of
general international law, often rendered "classic" international law
inadequate for the needs of the times. The right of auto-interpretation
of treaties, of auto-determination of international delinquencies, of
what state is responsible for them, and of the legal consequences all
gave great advantages to the powerful States. The absence of inter-
national courts with compulsory jurisdiction made the peaceful settle-
ment of international legal conflicts impossible except by agreement.
The absence of an international legislature rendered the problem of
"peaceful change" again only possible of solution by agreement.
"Classic" international law made the resort to war never an interna-
tional delinquency; war served not only as a sanction by way of self-
help, but also as a revolutionary means to change the law. The
principle of effectivity emphasized the role of the fait accompli. The
principle of sovereignty emphasized the "vital interests" of the mem-
bers, regardless of law. "Classic" general international law was a
primitive and a weak legal order.
Notwithstanding its primitiveness and its weakness, interna-
tional law, if one accepts it to be law, is necessarily a law above the
states-a "law inter pares." A "law of coordination" is necessarily
above the pares otherwise it would not be law at all. All law is by
nature heteronomous, or "vertical."
IVO
"Classic" international law had necessarily to delimit its own
competence from that of the sovereign states. Whereas the sovereignty
10 As to the problem dealt with in this Chapter, see the full discussion in this
writer's study in Spanish: "Teoria del Derecho Internacional." Inter-American Academy
of Comparative and International Law. Havanna. II Cursos Monogrificos 331-444
(1952).
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of states is limited by norms of international law, the spheres of
validity of international law are, in principle, unlimited. It is inter-
national law which determines by its norms which entities are "persons
in international law." The temporal sphere of validity is, in principle,
unlimited in the sense that general international law does not contain
norms by which its rules would be limited as to their temporal validity;
treaty norms, on the other hand, often contain rules limiting their
validity in time.
Unlimited also was the territorial sphere of validity of "classic"
international law. It included, by 1914, not only the territories of
nearly all the sovereign states, but, in addition, the high seas,
the air space above the high seas, and the terrae nullius.
The material sphere of validity of international law is also un-
limited. There are no matters which, by their nature, can only be
regulated by municipal law. International law has the "competence de
la comp6tence"; it may, at any moment, regulate matters which hith-
erto have been regulated only by municipal law. In a federal state
federal law is above the law of the states of the union, but this superi-
ority says nothing about the actual division of competences, thus, the
"comp6tence de la comp6tence" of international law says nothing as
to the actual division of competences between international law and
the sovereign states. This actual division of competences can always
only be stated on the basis of the analysis of the positive law actually
in force. Such analysis of "classic" international law shows that the
majority of competences and the most important ones were actually
given by international law to the sovereign states. This explains the
relatively small range of the norms of general international law and is
one of the reasons for the weakness of the international legal order.
Medieval Catholic Western Europe had its Constitution in the
"Communitas Christiana" with its two highest powers, Emperor and
Pope. Beginning in the late Middle Ages, the gradual decentralization
of this Christian Community brought about the appearance of the
national, territorial, sovereign states and the "international commu-
nity" as the successor of the Medieval Christian community as a loose
union, now consisting of sovereign states, which disclaimed any alle-
giance to Emperor and Pope. Their sovereignty was derived, as Bodin
stated for the King of France, "par Dieu et son 6p~e." This would
have brought about a situation of anarchy and constant threat of war.
To prevent that, international law came into being to guarantee rela-
tive peace among the now sovereign states. It must also not be for-
gotten that these new states, insisting on their sovereignty, recognized
the sovereignty of the other members of the Western-European Chris-
tian international community. The first and most urgent task of the
1961]
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new international law was, therefore, to secure the relatively peaceful
coexistence of the sovereign states of Christian Western Europe. This
was done by delimiting the jurisdictions of the sovereign states and
their legal orders inter se through rules of general international law
created by custom. Every legal norm and order has a fourfold validity:
as to time, as to matters, as to territory, and as to persons.
General international law delimited the validity of the legal or-
ders of sovereign states in time." It delimited their material validity,
a problem of jurisdiction, by granting to the sovereign states in prin-
ciple the highest and nearly exclusive jurisdiction within the territorial
limits of the state; later general international norms came into being,
limiting this jurisdiction in particular aspects.'2
The sovereign states and the international community are, pri-
marily, territorial communities; territory is, therefore, of the highest
importance. The states looked for territorial expansion; jurisdiction
was within the territorial limits of a state; territorial international
conflicts have been and are today the most dangerous international
conflicts and particularly likely to lead to war. It was, in consequence,
of the highest importance for general international law to delimit the
territorial validity of the legal orders of the sovereign states inter se
by norms of contents. Thus, the norms concerning acquisition and loss
of territorial sovereignty came into being. During the seventeenth
century the fundamental norm of the freedom of the high seas and,
simultaneously, the law of territorial waters came into being.
As the sovereign states and the international community were,
primarily, territorial communities, the delimitation of the personal
validity of the legal orders of the sovereign states was of lesser im-
portance. This explains why the delimitation of the personal sphere of
validity was not, as in the case of territory, done by general interna-
tional norms of contents, but only by general international norms of
competence. International law delegated to the sovereign states the
competence to regulate, in principle, the acquisition and loss of their
nationality by norms of their domestic law as they pleased. Thus, the
granting of nationality has remained, up to the present day, in prin-
ciple a "matter of domestic jurisdiction." But it is theoretically unten-
able to assert that this problem is not regulated by international law;
it is only regulated by international norms of competence and the
states are given this right by the international norm. But mere inter-
national rules of competence could not bring about a clear division of
11 Coming into being and end of a sovereign state, problems of state succession,
identity of states under international law.
12 E.g., Immunity and privileges of foreign diplomatic agents; the right of "innocent
passage" through territorial water; later the norms for the protection of citizens abroad.
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individuals between the different sovereign states. This state of things
finds expression in the recognition by international law of multiple
nationality as well as of statelessness.
In addition to delimiting the jurisdiction of sovereign states inter
se, it was of primary importance to create norms for the official inter-
course of sovereign states. The international law, concerning privileges
and immunities of diplomatic agents, purely customary general inter-
national law, is among the oldest and best observed parts of general
international law and even today in this highly divided world is least
attacked.
As there was for every state a right to go to war, the regulations
of the laws of war dominated the interest of early international law.
It is no hazard that in Grotius' "De jure belli ac pacis" the laws of
war come first.'3
All that the basic development of general international law tried
to solve was the first great problem, the problem of peaceful coexist-
ence. But international law has a second great task-international
cooperation of sovereign states. Here, general international law fur-
nished an excellent instrument in the international treaty and the
norm that sovereign states are free to conclude treaties, in principle,
on any subject matter.
V
We have seen that "classic" general international law is primitive
and unorganized," but the word "unorganized" has to be taken cum
grano salis. Any community must have organs through which alone
it can act. The international community is not "unorganized" in the
sense of having no organs; it is only primitively organized. Interna-
tional law has its organs, it also has its own organs; but it has no
special organs. Hence, the organs of the state have also to function as
international organs. It is this phenomenon, to a great extent basic
up to the present day, which Georges Scelle, with great insight, has
called "le d~doublement fonctionel."
The primitiveness, the "unorganized" status of general interna-
tional law could, even in the times of the "classic" law of nations, be
tempered by norms of particular international law created by treaty.
The treaty can create also special international organs; the treaty can
serve for achieving the second great task of international law, inter-
national cooperation between sovereign States. With the advance
13 Prior to Grotius "seul le droit de Ia guerre se developpe s6rieusement; i forme
le noyeau du droit international" E. Nys: Le droit de Ia guerre et les precurseurs de
Grotius (1S82), p. 7. "The most important as well as the first to spring into existence
was that (part of international law) which occupied itself with the laws of war" T. E.
Holland "Studies in International Law" p. 45 (1898).
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of time, and particularly in the nineteenth century, it became obvious
that the primitive unorganized international law was wholly inade-
quate for the needs of the times. The wish was to make international
law a more advanced law. Taking the development of municipal legal
orders from primitive to advanced ones as a model, it can be seen
that this advancement had to be brought about by centralization. But
here again a curious distinctiveness is shown. Were it possible to cen-
tralize international law in the same way as advanced municipal legal
orders, then the international community would be a relatively cen-
tralized community, which we could call a sovereign state; hence, in-
ternational law would come to an end and would be replaced by the
municipal law of the World, State. In consequence, it was tried to
advance and centralize international law only so far as not to infringe
the sovereignty of the members.
The idea of "organizing" the world-first the Western European
international community-is old in Occidental thinking. Just as gen-
eral international law had to solve, first, the problem of peaceful co-
existence, these early thinkers thought first of "eternal peace" and
only second of international cooperation. There is a long line of
utopian proposals for "eternal peace" by international organizations
from the beginning of the fourteenth to the end of the eighteenth cen-
tury in Occidental Europe. 4 But all of them show the typically
European, Occidental idea, that peace can be guaranteed by a loose
confederation of sovereign states and that, therefore, a World State
is not only impossible but not even desirable.' 5 This idea was adopted
by Simon Bolivar and tried unsuccessfully in the First Pan American-
ism. On this idea the League of Nations, as well as the United Nations
is based. Not only general international law, but also international
organization, even at the present time, is based on ancient Western
European ideas.
With this basic idea-no World State-in mind, the nineteenth
century recognized that the advance of international law lies in inter-
national organization. The treaty, as stated, is an excellent instrument
for international cooperation and can also create special international
organs. The treaty holds, therefore, a very important place in inter-
national law and has seen a great development: from the bilateral to
the multilateral and quasi-universal treaty; from the treaty, con-
cerned with a single problem, lying in the past, and giving a settle-
ment, creating only individual international norms, to the so-called
"law-making treaty," creating general international norms pro futuro,
14 Pierre Dubois (1305) to Abb6 de St. Pierre (1716); Kant: Zum ewigen Frieden
(1795).
15 See Walter Schiffer, "The Legal Community of Mankind," 1954.
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or creating even a Constitution of an international organization. It is
certainly theoretically incorrect, even today, to speak of "international
legislation," but it is true that in the absence of an international legis-
lature the treaty is still the best substitute.
We see, further, under "classic" international law the great devel-
opment of the International Conference: Peace Congresses, "to remake
the map of Europe"; ad hoc political Conferences,"7 Peace Con-
gresses, creating also some general rules of international law pro
futuro; 18 international conferences, convoked in time of peace, ex-
clusively for the purpose of creating general norms of international
law'" or for writing the constitution of a new particular international
organization; international conferences as permanent organs of inter-
national organizations. 0
There were attempts at regional organizations; Simon Bolivar,
in this respect the forerunner of Woodrow Wilson and of the League
of Nations and then the second Pan-Americanism since 1889. There
was an attempt at a political Government for maintaining peace in
Europe through the hegemony of the Great Powers, by the Holy Alli-
ance and the Concert of Europe, although wholly political rather than
legal. Some ideas of this European experience re-appear in the Secur-
ity Council of the U.N. as it was planned by the makers of the U.N.
Charter at San Francisco in 1945.
Since 1772 we see a revival of international arbitration, although
the latter remained primitively organized and was, at the end of the
nineteenth and the beginning of this century, strongly over-estimated
as the principal way of insuring international peace. The principle of
compulsory jurisdiction of international tribunals was, just as today,
rejected by sovereignty. There was even the first pre-established per-
manent international court, the Central American Court of Justice.
The court, although restricted to Central America, of short duration
and of no outstanding achievements, was the first of its kind in history.
There was, as the climax of "classic" international law, the system
of the Hague Peace Conferences which partially codified the peaceful
settlement of international conflicts, the law of war and neutrality;
but no one dared even to question the right of unlimited resort to war
by the sovereign states.
Multilateral treaties, sometimes quasi-universal, were concluded
for international non-political cooperation in the fields of communi-
16 Westphalia, 1648; Utrecht, 1713.
17 Berlin, 1878; Congo, 1885.
18 Vienna, 1815; Paris, 1856.
19 Hague Peace Conferences, 1899 and 1907.
20 International Conferences of American States.
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cations, economics, cultural cooperation, and the protection of men
(against slave trade, for the suppression of traffic in women, begin-
nings of an international labor law). Even more important, some of
these multilateral treaties created special international organs. There
were the International River Commissions and particularly important,
from the point of view of organization, the European Danube Com-
mission which was empowered to make Ordinances for the navigation
of the lower Danube immediately binding on those who navigated this
stream. The Commission which had its own courts, was independent
and neutral from the country in which it sat, and had its own flag.
Of the highest importance were the International Administrative
Unions.2' They survive and some of them have become U.N. Special-
ized Agencies. Here we have permanent, special international bureau-
cratic organs; here are the beginnings of an "internal law of interna-
tional organization," the beginnings of an "international civil service."
The typical, tripartite organization of these Unions has served as the
model for all later international organizations, whether big or small,
universal or regional, general or specialized. Here we see already the
fact that these international organizations for non-political cooperation
were much more successful than the attempts at international political
organizations for maintaining the peace.
VI
The distinctiveness of "classic" international law by comparison
and contrast lies in the fact that it is, in general, a primitive legal order.
But there is also another source of distinctiveness, particularities of
a sociological nature, as writers like Max Huber, Dietrich Schindler
and the late Professor Brierly22 have shown. Such sociological factors
are, quite apart from primitiveness, also important reasons for the
distinctiveness of the international legal order.
There is, first, the relatively small number of "persons" under
"classic" international law-only the limited number of sovereign
States-and each State is unique. It is, therefore, very difficult
for general international law to create general, abstract norms con-
trary to municipal legal orders which can much more easily make
norms for transactions, e.g., contracts, which happen innumerable
times between individuals whom the law has typified and schematized
into "persons."
21 See Josef L. Kunz, "Experience and Technique in International Administration,"
31 Iowa L. Rev. 40 (1945).
22 J. L. Brierly, "The Law of Nations" (4th ed. Oxford. 1944). See also, Charles
de Visscher, "Theory and Reality in Public International Law," Princeton. 1957 (English
translation).
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There are not only few "persons" in "classic" international
law, but each is also "sovereign" and "equal" and disposes of power,
whereas the international community has not only no monopoly of
force, contrary to advanced municipal legal orders, but practically no
power at all. This sociological fact, the individualistic distribution of
power among the members, even small ones, and particularly the Great
Powers, is fundamental for the distinctiveness of the international
legal order, as Charles de Visscher has stressed.
In addition, the international community, even under "classic"
international law, was, in the terms of German sociologists, as Brierly
has underlined, not a community, but only a society; the French
term for the League of Nations: "Socift6 des Nations," society of
states, was correct. There was, even prior to 1914, no real common
axiological foundation, and, in general, no loyalty of individuals to-
ward the international community. The lack of a common system of
values makes a legal order weak. This weakness, Brierly has stated,
goes deeper than the problem of sanctions; it is, he states, not the
existence of a police which makes a legal order strong, but, to the
contrary, it is the vigor of the law which makes a police force possible.
Finally, whereas advanced municipal law regulates the conduct of
individuals who are powerless as compared with the monopoly of force at
the disposal of the community, international law regulates the conduct
of "sovereign states," i.e., of enormous groups of individuals, disposing
of power. This is the great difficulty of international sanctions, the
importance of "vital interests."
This is a great source of distinctiveness of international law by
comparison and contrast. But in order not to lose the right perspec-
tive for this distinctiveness, two things must not be forgotten. First,
even "classic" international law functioned very well in the everyday
problems of the conduct between sovereign states and in minor con-
flicts and it was only in the big problems of war and peace, that it
often failed.23 Second, on the other hand, this distinctiveness shows
itself only fully when comparison is with advanced municipal legal or-
ders and in normal times. This distinctiveness is much less, in com-
parison with states where there is no common system of values, but
internal strife. There is also, even under advanced legal orders, the
possibility of insurrection and civil war. Here, like in international
affairs, it is military victory which is also legally decisive; what, in the
event of failure, is treason,24 becomes in the event of success, the start-
23 That is why the late Sir Hersh Lauterpacht applied to international law the
contrary of the old Roman Law proverb: "In maximis non curat praetor."
24 An old little English verse states ironically:
"Treason cannot prosper; what's the reason?
For if it does, who would dare to call it treason?"
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ing-point of a new constitution of a new country. The problem of a
military execution by a Federal State against a state of the union, is
as delicate an operation, as an international military sanction. Where
a great mass of workers, disposing of power, strike, it is often preferred,
whether they are legally right or wrong, to negotiate rather than to
go into court.25 The problems of international law, whether in con-
sequence of its primitiveness or on account of sociological particulari-
ties, are not unique with international law. The distinctiveness of
"classic" international law, as compared with and contrasted against
advanced municipal legal orders, is very great but it is not absolute.
VII
After the First World War the attempt was made to develop
international law much faster, to make a big leap forward by way of
centralization, i.e., by international organization. It was a turning point
for, but not a break with, "classic" international law. This "new"
international law has gone, and is going, up to now, through two pe-
riods: the period between the two World Wars, or the period of the
League of Nations, and the present period since 1945, the period of
the United Nations.
The League of Nations was the first successful attempt to set up
in positive law a quasi-universal international organization which did
not only successfully expand machinery for international, non-political
cooperation 6 but dared also to regulate problems of "high politics":
partial restriction of the right of sovereign states to go to war, declar-
ing certain matters as being of "international concern," the system
of "collective security" through collective sanctions, and reduction of
armaments. But the continuity with "classic" international law was,
from the beginning, obvious. The League was based on the sovereignty
of its members, on the Occidental idea of keeping the peace through a
mere loose confederation of sovereign states; it strongly rejected in
its beginnings the idea of being a "super-state" and, most certainly,
it was not. Its gradual decline and its final disappearance in the holo-
caust of the Second World War brought an illusion to an end. The
individualistic distribution of power among the members remained
untouched. Europe retained its hold on great parts of Asia and Africa
25 Macchiavelli wrote in his "I1 Principe," that "from superior to inferior one com-
mands; but between equals one negotiates."
26 Particularly the International Labor Organization, the only part of the League
of Nations which survived in 1946; also the "Institute of International Intellectual
Cooperation" at Paris, succeeded by UNESCO. For the international protection of
persons or groups see the system of mandates, the Anti-Slavery Treaty of 1926, The
Nansen Office of Refugees; the new, particular international law for the protection of
national, linguistic and religious minorities.
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and the exclusive values of the Occidental culture as the basis of
international law continued. The League became, more and more, a
preponderantly European organization, run by Great Britain and
France. The United States never was a member.
After the apocalyptic events of the Second World War a period of
much greater change of international law started in 1945. The "new"
international law of the present period is one of flux, change, uncer-
tainty, and crisis. But not only is the connection with the League of
Nations period clear, but, up to now, no break with "classic" interna-
tional law has occurred. There are many reasons for this far-reaching
transformation and crisis of international law, reasons which can here
only be briefly listed:27 the complete change of general conditions;
the coming of totalitarian governments; scientific and technological
advances; the coming of the atomic and the space age; the appearance
of new forms of political warfare; the complete change of the strategy,
tactics, and goals of warfare; the relative decline of Europe, creator of
the Occidental culture and of our international law; the "bipolarity"
of the present world to which China may soon have to be added besides
the "uncommitted" and "neutralist" States; the deep ideological split
between the democratic and the communistic world, each led by one
of the two Great Powers; the "cold war" and the continuous political
crises on a world-wide scale; the "anti-colonial" rebellion; the entry on
the international stage of non-Occidental cultures; the "rebellion of
rising expectations"; neo-Malthusian fears; often expressed in the
pessimistic slogan of the "population explosion"; growing nationalism;
an upsurge of sovereignty; signs of a weakening and decline of our
Occidental culture from within; a decline of the respect for law. It is
only natural that the combined influence of so many far-reaching
causes in this terribly dynamic, rapidly changing world, in this revo-
lutionary period of transition, can hardly make the present status of
international law a happy one. Let us briefly sketch the consequences
of these causes, in order to arrive, by comparison and contrast, at a
judgment on the distinctiveness of present-day international law.
1. There is, first, a very important change since 1945, as to the
composition and the value-system of the international community.
Even prior to 1914, the international community, as stated, was hard-
ly a true community; the expansion of international law in its terri-
torial validity, although it remained based exclusively on the values
of the Occidental culture, was brought about at the cost of a dilution
27 For a full discussion see this writer's lectures in French at the Hague Academy
of International Law, held in 1955: "La Crise et les Transformations du Droit des Gens"
(88 Recueil des Cours, 1955, II, 1-104); see also this writer's article, "The Changing
Law of Nations," 51 Am. J. Int'l L. 77 (1957).
1961]
464 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 22
of its contents. Since 1945 the existence of an "international com-
munity" has become problematical and whatever unity of values may
have existed before has been lost. This is, first, a consequence of the
deep ideological split between the democratic and the communistic
world, led by the Soviet Union, and of the "cold war." Some ideas,
goals and procedures of the Soviet Union are clearly incompatible
with the values of the Occidental culture. The real split is not between
the different economic systems, but is a spiritual abyss between the
Occidental culture for which human dignity and liberty is basic, for
which the State exists only for the individual, and collectivism, for
which the individuals exist only for the State. To that extent the
Soviet Union has openly admitted that its ultimate goal is a world
dominated by communism and constantly expresses its deep conviction
that this goal will be reached, although it expresses also its hope that
this goal can be reached without a third world war. Hence, "a peaceful
co-existence"-it has been clearly stated2 -is only an instrument for
the interim period, a more perfect form of the "class struggle," the
correct path to the "triumph of communism on a world-wide scale."
On the other hand, there is the appearance of many new states in
former colonial or quasi-colonial areas of Asia and Africa, the appear-
ance on the international stage of many non-Occidental cultures. 9
Since 1945 the international community has become, for the first time,
truly international and no longer primarily dominated by states of the
Occidental-Christian culture.
Both these developments have far-reaching consequences, not
only as far as the unity of the international community is concerned,
but also with regard to the universality, to the contents, and to the
certainty of the norms of international law.
2. The international community has also been changed since 1945
by the expansion of international law, as to its subjects. The present-
day international community, and its law, is no longer exclusively
restricted to sovereign states, although the latter remain, and probably
will remain for any foreseeable time, not only the most numerous, but
also by far the most important subjects of international law. But
there are now many other subjects of international law, although, by
no means, necessarily with the same legal status as sovereign states.
There are "partial" subjects of international law, such as certain
states of Federal Unions (Bielorussia, Ukraine), colonies, and terri-
torial communities, created by treaty, such as the "Free Territory of
28 Statement by leaders of 81 Communist parties at the Moscow Meeting The New
York Times, 7 December 1960, pp. 14, 15.
29 See this writer's article, "Pluralism of Legal and Value Systems and International
Law," 49 Am. J. Int'l L. 370 (1955).
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Trieste" had it come into existence. There is the evergrowing number
of international organizations, many of which have international per-
sonality. There is the attempt to make the individual a direct subject
of international law; either a direct subject of international duties and
responsibility-the attempted "international criminal law"--or the di-
rect subject of international rights-the attempted law for the inter-
national protection of human rights. This development sometimes
brings about doubts and uncertainty as to the contents of this "inter-
national community." There has not only been an expansion of the
subjects, but also of the contents of international law. It no longer
deals exclusively with the rights and duties of sovereign states; its
scope includes today also stateless persons and refugees, indigenous
populations of trusteeship territories, international labor problems, the
solution of international social, financial, economic, health, communi-
cation, educational problems, economic and technical aid to under-
developed countries, and many more topics.
3. Even "classic" international law was to a great extent incom-
plete, inadequate and uncertain. The present-day international law
under the influence of all these causes of transformation and crisis is
characterized by rapid change and a high degree of inadequacy and
uncertainty. Even the present-day international law is, as to the mak-
ing of norms of international law, basically as "unorganized" and
primitive as "classic" international law.
Great violations of the laws of war and neutrality in two world
wars, the influence of the illusion that "war has been abolished," the
coming of new and terrible arms of mass destruction, atomic and hy-
drogen bombs, international ballistic missiles, gas and bacteriological
warfare, and the complete change of forms and goals of warfare
have brought about since 1945 a chaotic state of the laws of war.
Although in these last years some progress has been made, the laws
of war remain to a high degree incomplete, inadequate, and un-
certain. This is also true as far as the international law of neutral-
ity is concerned. This uncertainty of present-day international law
covers about one half of "classic" international law.
Not only the forms and techniques of actual warfare, but also
those of political struggle in a deeply divided world have changed
considerably. Political propaganda, psychological warfare against
other states by means of powerful media of mass-communication, the
system of "iron curtains," prevention of the free flow of men and
ideas, the fact that political parties in many countries are controlled,
financed, and dominated by foreign, ideologically opposed states, highly
developed techniques of subversion, veiled intervention, civil wars with
foreign intervention, the use of "resistance movements" and so-called
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"volunteers," "wars by proxy," delivery of technical, economic, and
military aide to rebels in foreign countries for subversive purposes,
have made norms centering around the "prohibition of intervention"
highly insecure.
The strong expansion of economic activities by states has made
uncertain not only many norms of the laws of war and neutrality, but
also many other norms, e.g., concerning "sovereign immunity."
A great deal of inadequacy or uncertainty of rules of international
law is the consequence of new scientific and technological advance-
ments such as the norms of aerial warfare, the use of weapons of mass
destruction, the law of aviation, the atomic law, the law of outer space.
Nearly all these problems have importance for peaceful as well as for
military purposes.
Furthermore, we are faced with the ideological split between the
democratic and the communistic world and the attitude of the new
States of non-Occidental cultures. That renders even old rules of
international law hitherto not questioned, uncertain and doubtful. The
Soviet Union feels that certain rules are unacceptable, as being an
expression of "capitalism," or must be "re-interpreted"; hence, her
reliance primarily on treaties concluded by herself. On the other
hand, the new states, arising in former colonial or quasi-colonial terri-
tories, feel that most of general international law has been made by
"colonial" powers exclusively in their own interest, not taking into
consideration the interests of these new states. In addition, as they had
no part in making these rules, they have never freely given their con-
sent. It is interesting to note that some states of Latin-America, al-
though independent for one hundred and fifty years and belonging to
the Occidental-Christian culture, have now, because of their economic
backwardness and in consequence of the "revolution of rising expecta-
tions," sometimes joined Communist or Afro-Asian states. This has
led to a serious weakening of the Organization of American States.
From all these reasons, it is easily understood that great departments
of general international law of the highest importance, such as the
norms, concerning the sanctity of private property, the protection of
citizens abroad, denial of justice, espousal, confiscation, nationalization,
expropriation, fulfillment of contracts, concluded for the economic de-
velopment of a country between a state and a foreign corporation, are
in a status of high uncertainty.
4. All these developments have brought about a tremendous
growth of nationalism, an upsurge of the feeling and demands of sov-
ereignty, not only among Communist and new states, but also among
democratic states. This explains the uncertainty now surrounding the
fundamental principle of the freedom of the high sea, and the new
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norms, concerning the continental shelf, the unilateral claims as to
the width of territorial waters, contiguous zones, fishing rights, and
so on. Also uncertain are the international norms concerning the use
of great international streams for purposes other than navigation, such
as irrigation or hydroelectric power.
This nationalism and upsurge of sovereignty has also intensified
the wish of many states to be judex in causa sna, the rejection of third-
party judgment. Communist States never submit a case to the Inter-
national Court of Justice for they see in it a "loss of sovereignty."
But the distrust in the present "capitalistic" international law, in the
Court, the majority of the judges of which came from "capitalistic"
countries, is also a prominent factor; only an angel, said Molotov,
could be impartial in a case between "capitalism" and "socialism."
For similar reasons, distrust of international law made by "colonial"
powers, and distrust of the bench made up of a majority of judges
coming from "colonial" powers, as well as the uncertainty of interna-
tional law, keep the new states from going to the International Court
of Justice. But the upsurge of sovereignty, even among democratic
states, can be seen in the relatively small business of the Hague Court,
the declining number of states accepting the "optional clause," the
growing number of reservations, and the use of reservations as to con-
tents and as to time limits which practically annul the effect of the
optional clause. Not only has it not been possible to accept the prin-
ciple of compulsory jurisdiction of the international court, but the role
of this Court has declined as compared with League of Nations times.
International law has not only no sanctions, but an extreme scarcity of
legal remedies.
5. Add to the above "Marxist dialectics" which makes communi-
cation between the democratic and the communist world even more
difficult; the same words of basic norms, as e.g., "aggression," are in-
terpreted in the opposite sense, so that the two leading Great Powers,
invoking the same legal norm, can blame each other for "aggression."
The very weakening of the Occidental culture from within has
led to a decline of law in general, and of the international Rule of
Law in particular.
6. The rise of international organizations is a distinctive feature
of the present period. There is no doubt that the growing number of
specialized organizations, general and regional, is not merely a fashion,
but deeply corresponds, even in the present-day divided world, to a
true necessity. While it has not yet changed the basic structure of the
international community, there are possibilities of fruitful develop-
ment. It is recognized by states of all types of ideology that these
international organizations are necessary. It may well lead to an inter-
1961]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
national community still based on sovereign states but in which many
functions, hitherto in the hands of single sovereign states on a terri-
torial basis, may be delegated to international organizations on a func-
tional basis, but transcending the territories of the member-states
either on a world-wide or a regional scale. There are not only the
"international" organizations in the traditional sense; there are also
the highly interesting "Public International Corporations" '30 and there
are "supra-national" organs.3 The expansion of international organ-
izations has brought many new and progressive norms of international
law: international organizations as subjects of the international com-
munity, norms in the field of international treaties, privileges and im-
munities, responsibility, capacity to claim indemnities. While inter-
national organizations are based on general international law, they have
also influenced the latter.3 The international organizations have led
to new departments of international law such as "the internal law of
international organizations," the "international law of the international
civil service." In these cases as well as under the hypothesis of a trus-
teeship exercised directly by the U.N. itself, we have to deal with
norms which, as to their origin, function, and sphere of validity, are
strictly international norms, but which, as to their structure (directly
binding on individuals, direct sanctions and so on), are not different
from the norms of advanced municipal legal orders.
There has been progress concerning the U.N. Charter since 1945:
the prohibition of the use of threat of force in international re-
lations, collective security, the Security Council as an international
organ which can decide and act with legally binding consequences for
the members, the intended international protection of human rights.
But basically the U.N., even as designed, is not more than a second
League of Nations, based again on the Occidental idea of international
organization-a mere loose confederation of sovereign states with
the remaining individualistic distribution of power among the sover-
eign states. The combined influences here discussed have, of course,
made the U.N. in 1961 into a very different organization from what
the makers of the Charter had intended. On the other hand, contrary
to the League of Nations, the prestige of the U.N. has hitherto re-
mained great. All new states immediately apply for membership. No
state, up to now, has withdrawn from the U.N. Although collective
security has proven again to be an illusion, although the U.N. is ad-
mittedly incapable of maintaining international peace, although not
much has been achieved as regards the international protection of hu-
30 See H. T. Adam, Les Etablissements Publics Internationaux. Paris. 1957.
31 See this writer's article, "Supra-National Organs," 46 Am. J. Int'l L. 690 (1952).
32 See this writer's article on that topic in 47 Am. J. Int'l L. 456 (1953).
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man rights, although the breakdown of collective and the prohibition
of individual sanctions has rendered international law practically de-
void of any sanctions of its norms, it retains great international use-
fulness. But even that is threatened in the present crisis: the uncer-
tain operation in the Congo, the heavy attacks, particularly against
the Secretary General by the Soviet Union and the Communist bloc,
the danger of financial bankruptcy, the strong indictment by the Presi-
dent of France who refused not only to make payments for the Congo
operation, but spoke of the "global incoherence" of this "disorganiza-
tion" and of the General Assembly as "tumultuous and scandalous
meetings in which it is impossible to arrange an objective debate,"
make the future of the U.N. uncertain.
7. As every period of transition and crisis, the present period is
full of contradictions and paradoxes. While the U.N. Charter rests on
peace, tolerance and good-neighborliness, the present world is one of
the most bitter struggles for life and death. While there is the wave
of anti-colonialism, the Soviet Union in the words of General de Gaulle
has set up "the greatest imperialism which the history of the world
has seen." While the U.N. Charter preaches the maintenance of hu-
man dignity, of human rights and fundamental freedoms, humanity has
suffered in the last thirty years more cruel suppressions than at any
time before. While there is the tremendous longing for independence
by small and unprepared communities, there is also a tendency of
states to go closer together in regional or supra-national unions.
Whereas the U.N. Charter is based on respect for international law,
there is a great deal of international lawlessness in the present-day
world. Whereas the U.N. Charter wanted to bring collective sanctions,
international law is today practically without any sanctions. Whereas
the U.N. Charter forbids the use or threat of force to render the world
more lawful, this prohibition, coupled with the political possibilities of
the "cold war," has had the effect of making even smaller states more
lawless and has had the effect of creating an unwillingness in small
states to submit to the jurisdiction of an international court. Whereas
the U.N. Charter was designed to severely restrict the sovereignty of
the members with the exception of the permanent members of the Se-
curity Council, there is everywhere an upsurge of sovereignty. Sover-
eignty, independence, equality, and non-intervention seem to be the only
rule on which democratic, communist and new states are in agreement.
Whereas peace should rely on law and on collective security, such(9peace," as we have today, is based on the precarious "balance of
terror"; the most uniting fact of the international community seems to
be common fear of annihilation.
The general decline of law has made the Rule of Law, contrary
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to the League of Nations, of little importance in the U.N. Legal argu-
ments are seldom used. In this period of uncertainty there is distrust
and disrespect of law and legal considerations are being treated under
the contemptuous and pejorative term of "legalistic." The place of
law has been taken by politics.
Many of the progressive rules of the "new" international law are
uncertain, ineffective, experimental and, in some cases, ephimeral.
The present situation of the world makes the most important is-
sues of political tension unfit for a peaceful solution. In such a period
not much real progress of international law can be expected; de-
velopments may be absolutely necessary, but they are impossible of
achievement. While a scientific analysis of the present situation of
international law must by necessity be pessimistic, the same objectivity
views more hopeful signs such as, in addition to those named earlier,
the successes of codification by the International Law Commission, the
Geneva Conventions of 1949, the Geneva Conference of 1958, the Sec-
ond Vienna Congress, the International Geophysical Year, and the
Treaty on Antarctica. There is also a strong hope that man, after hav-
ing invented the weapons for his own self-destruction, will be unwilling
to make use of them. It is difficult to say whether international law,
seen as a whole and compared with former times has progressed or not.
But as it stands today, there is no break yet, either with the League of
Nations period or with "classic" international law.
Apart from the advances and retrogressions, the crisis and dan-
gers, the distinctiveness of international law is the same as before. It
is based on (1) primitiveness (no superior, international legislature,
highly decentralized, hardly any sanctions, no international courts with
compulsory jurisdiction) and on (2) the sociological peculiarities (deal-
ing with enormous groups of persons, sovereignty of states, vital in-
terests, less a community than before, even a certain disintegration of
the international community, a threat to the universality of the validity
of international law, the same sociological foundation in the individual-
istic distribution of power among the sovereign states.)
This distinctiveness is great, but not absolute, by comparison with,
and contrast against, other legal orders. The distinctiveness is greatest
in comparison with the private law of advanced municipal legal orders,
particularly in advanced and politically stable states; it is less in
comparison with primitive municipal legal orders for here the primitive-
ness is a common factor. It is also less by comparison with certain
fields of public law of advanced municipal legal orders, because they
have some of the sociological particularities in common.
It is very possible that the present period of struggle, uncertainty,
33 See Julius Stone, "Law and Policy in the Quest for Survival," (Sydney 1960).
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transition and crisis will go on for the rest of the present century. It
is, therefore, impossible to predict the future of international law.
The sentence which the President of the United States3 4 applied to
the present world situation, applies also to the present status of inter-
national law, a "Time of rising dangers and of persistent hope."
34 President Kennedy's Special Message to Congress on Defense Spending, The New
York Times, March 29, 1961, p. 16.
